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SUMMARY
A new empirical study of the relation between money, nominal income,
prices, and real output in postwar quarterly U.S. data rejects virtually all
of the conclusions reached by Robert Barro in his three papers on the topic
(AER 1977, JPE 1978, and 1978 conference paper with Mark Rush). A distinction
is drawn between the Lucas—Sargent--Wallace (LSW) theory that only unanticipated
monetary changes influence real output, and the orthodox view that anticipated
monetary changes influence real output in the short run during the interval of
adjustment of prices to the monetary change. The LSW proposition requires for
its validity a contemporaneous and equiproportionate response of the expected
price level to the anticipated level of money or nominal CNP, whereas the
orthodox approach requires that price expectations depend at least partly on
the past history of prices rather than entirely on the expected level of
nominal demand.
The results uniformly support the orthodox approach. The Livingston
expectations series exhibits a highly significant response to past price
changes, and only a slight response to current expectations about nominal GNP
or money. The actual inflation rate also depends heavily on past price changes,
with an insignificant impact of current expectations of nominal GNP, or money.
The equations that relate real output to the deviation of changes of nominal
income (both anticipated and unanticipated) from past price changes fit the
data significantly better than Barro's approach using current and lagged
values of money tisurprises!! The pure version of the LSW approach relating






The. pointof departure for this series of empirical papers by Robert
Batro is the proposition, associated with. the names of Lucas, Sargent, arid
Wallace. (LSW), that real output is independent of predictable movements in
1
the. money supply. The. innovative and controversial feature of this hy-
pothesis is nQt that money is neutral in the long run, for this proposi—
tion—'tthe. natural rate" hypothesis (NRE)-.—was accepted by a substantial
majority of economists by the time the LSW hypothesis was advanced. In-
stead, if it is to haveanyindependent content, the LSW hypothesis must
state that systematic monetary stabilization has no effect on output In the
short—run.
Ifvalid, the LSW hypothesis would undermine much of the existing
literature on stabilization policy. Regular countercyclical activist inter-
vention, implemented as a predictable response to movements in output or
2
unemployment, would be both. futile and unnecessary. The entire optimal
control branch of the stabilization policy literature, and existing demon-
strations thatparticularderivative or proportional feedback control f or—
mulae are more effective stabilizers than a constant—growth—rate—rule,
3
would be rendered irrelevant. The concept of the political business cycle,
and of the manipulation of the economy for electoral purposes, would be
4
relegated to a museum for obsolete economic ideas.
Because of the radical Lmplications of the LSW hypothesis for the theory
and practice of stabilization policy, it is understandable that macroecono—
mists should have eagerly awaited a convincing empirical verification. But2
it is surprising to me that the series of papers by Robert Barro would be
5
regarded as providing any such empirical support.Forthe Bca"ro pccpers
proviTdeno test at all of the short—run neutrczZ-ity proposition of ESW that
would dstin h t from the widely-accepted long—run "natural rate"
neutralCtyypotesis CNREJ. Barrospapers fail to provide any support for
theLSW hypothesisfor three separate reasons:
1. There is no explicit empirical test of the leading competing
hypothesis upon which. the orthodox stabilization literature rests its case——
that short—run inertia and stickiness of price adjustment allowsany change
in nominal income (whether anticipated or unanticipated) to affect real out-
put in the short run. The Gradual Adjustment of Prices (GAP) hypothesis is
fully compatible with the long—run neutrality of NRH if the inflation rate
gradually but continuously accelerates whenever output exceeds its tinaturalt?
level. GAP combined with NRH implies that any permanent shift in the growth
rate of nominal income is initially divided between faster growth in both
output and prices, but that gradually the output stimulus vanishes until
higher Inflation has fully absorbed the nominal income acceleration.
2. Far from attempting to distinguish, the LSW and NRB.—GAP ky-
potheses, Barro compares as determinants of output on the one hand unantici-
pated moneychange,andon the other handrati noneychange. The statistical
defeat of the. latter appears to be the only evidence put forth tosupport
the. LSW hypothesis. But this is like setting up a World Series between the
Yankees and a team of geriatric invalids. The real Yankee—Dodger World
SerIes for the output-determination trophy (see. below) pits unanticipated
money change as one explanatory variable versus.the deviation between actual3
money change and an adaptively—adjusting expected price change as the
competing variable. Barro's correlations between the output gap and rcm.'
money change make no contribution whatsoever to distinguishing the dubious
L hypothesis from tha widely accepted NRH, becáüseany such long—run re-
lation betweenareal variable (output) and a nominal variable (rawmoney
change) would violate the NRH. We know that the acceleration ofmonetary
growth between the.. 1950s and 1970s did not produce a 'tpermanent economic
high," but this fact does not by itself constitute evidence against the
short—run potency of stabilization policy.
3. Not only do Barro's output and unemploymentequations fail to
provide any evidence supportvng the LSW hypothesis, but, worseyet, his
price equations strongly undermine the theoretical rationale of the LSW hy-
pothesis by validating the competing NRH—G.AP hypothesis. Barro estimates
that the full adjustment of prices to changes in the money supply takes
between four and six years, while the formation of anticipations
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about monetary changes takes only a single quarter.For LSW to be
valid, any fully anticipated monetary change that raises nominal income must
raise prices s-CmutaneQuly., since the hypothesis states that realoutput
must remain unaffected. Thus Barro's price equations fail to validate the
one—quarter lag betweenzctua7money and the price level that would be
necessary to confirm the required contemporaneous response of the price level
to an anticipated money change. \Inthe long interval between the single—
quarter adjustment of expectations about monetary change, and the fourth or
sixth year required for the full price. response..tooccur,anticipated mone—
tary change can affect real output.The result of Barro's research on4
prices, with its finding of a 24—quarter time interval between a monetary
change and the full adjustment of prices, seems to amount to little more
than a reconfirmation of my earlier study (1975) which found a 28—quarter
8
lag.
2. A STATE1fENT OF TEE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
The Lucas supply function on which the LSW hypothesis is based states
that the gap (Ht) between log output and log natural output (Q) depends on
the difference between the actual and expected rate of change of prices
—p):
(1) Ht = +
9
where is a stochastic error term with mean zero.
Most current econometric models which generate orthodox conclusions about
the short—run potency of stabilization policy determine prices by an expec—
tational Phillips curve equation that relates the same variables as follows:
(1') Pt + +
The difficulty of distinguishing between the LSW hypothesis based on (1) and
the orthodox conclusions based on (1') is evident in comparing the two equa-
tions, since (1') is just an inverted version of (1), and vice versa.
If expectations are rational, and the p term in (1) incorporates
all past information (including the serial correlation properties of
then the forecast error —p)should be serially uncorrelated, leading to
the criticism that equation (1) cannot explain the high degree of positive
serial correlation observed in actual data on Ht. However, the LSW hypothesis5
can be rescued from this line of criticism if the output gap depends at
least partly on its own past values:
(2) Ht = — i')+ Z +
1=1
Forinstance, Blinder and Fischer (1978) have rationalized (2) on the
grounds that a positive price "surprise" will lead firms to raise sales
more than production, decuniulating inventories, and then to rebuild their
stocks of inventories gradually in future periods. Thus, even if there
is no price surprise in period t-#-1, the output gap(H+i) would depend
positively on the output gap last period (He) and in earlier periods as
well.
It is possible to derive Barro's estimated equation linkingoutput
to a distributed lag of past monetary changes from equation (2), ifwe
begin by calling upon the "quantity identity" to provide a connection
between the rates of change of prices, money, velocity, and realoutput:
Ptmt+v
Further, if prices are known to clear markets, then a rational expectation
of the price level will equal the difference between theexpected level of
nominal income and output, with all level variables in logs:
(4) E1(P) =E1(M)+ Ei(V) —
'1henwe substitute the expectation of the output gap equation (2) into (4),
we obtain:
(5) E_1(P) =Et1(M)+ E1(V) —— ze.Htl.6
Using the definitions that relate expectations of the rates of change of
variables to expectations of their levels, (5) is equivalent to:
(6) p = +ye + Ht_l —EOIHt_I.
When the difference between (3) and (6) is, substituted into (2), we can
solve by recursion to obtain a direct relation between the current output
gap and current and lagged "surprises" in the growth of both money and
velocity.
(7) H =z -1-fct(m—e÷ —v).+
i=O
where =1.
Note in (6) that the expected change in the price level depends on ex-
pected nominal GNP growth, adjusted both for the growth of natural output
(q) and for the influence of arty non—zero output gaps that may have occurred
in previous periods. Thus in this version of the LSW model that allows for
persistence in the output gap, as in equation (2), the expected change in
prices does not simply echo the expected growth of nominal GNP. Depending
on whether the total influence of the lagged gap terms is positive or
negative, a one—percentage—point increase in expected nominal GNP growth
could be accompanied by an increase in expected price change of either more
10
or less than one percentage point.
The estimated output equation in Table 1 of Barro—Rush (1979) can be
viewed as an empirical representation of equation (7). Barro—Rush find that
monetary surprises (rn_me) in ten past quarters are significant in explaining
output. Significant positive serial correlation is present in the estimated7
Barro—Rush output equations, corresponding to the presence in (7) of the
past error terms The only important difference is that Barro—Rush
agents are assumed to be able to predict velocity with precise accuracy,
while their uncanny predictive powers do not extend to perfect foresight
about the money supply——thus only monetary surprises are included in their
estimated output equation rather than the more general form (7) which calls
for real output to depend on surprises in nominal GNP growth.
How can the LSW hypothesis that real output is independent of antic-
ipated changes in nominal GNP be distinguished from the NRH—GAP hypothesis
that anticipated nominal GNP changes influence real output during the in-
terval of price adjustment? Clearly, no empirical research on the hy-
potheses can make headway if it simply involves a comparison of the Lucas
supply equation in (1) with the expectational Phillips curve in (1'), since
the two equations are just inverted versions of each other. Instead, a
different approach is required. Leaving aside the lagged gap terms, it is
apparent in (6) that the LSW approach requires expected inflation to be
based on expectations of nominal GNP growth, whereas the essence of the
competing NRH—GAP hypothesis is that inertia in the adjustment of prices
prevents an instantaneous response of expected price change to expected
nominal GNP change. In its most extreme version, NRH—GAP would state that
expected inflation responds only to past inflation, with no response at all
to anticipated demand conditions:
(8)p =ZA1p
1=1
A more rational version of the formation of expectations under the NRE—GAP
hypothesis would take account both of inertia and of knowledge of the8
structure of (1'), that is, of the partial dependence of inflation on
11
shifts in demand (H):-
(9) p =Z +bH. i=l
We can compare (9) with a version of the LSW price expectation equa-
tion that is similar to Barro's owii price equation. Substituting the re—
lation between the output gap and lagged "surprises" from equation (7) into
(6), we obtain:
* i e e e
(10) p. =m+ v —q.+ Z u. Z y..
1=1 1=1 313,
whereu =t/(l)1[a(m_me+v_ve)t+ct1,and y1(l—O1), while y.= —0. for 1>1.
Two main differences are evident in comparing the NRR—GAPapproachin (9)
with the implied LSW equation in (10). First, the influence of past his-
tory is represented in (9) by actual price change, but in (10) by past nom-
inal GNP surprises. Second, given the past history of surprises, (10)
states that there should be a contemporaneous and equiproportionate "jump"
in the expected rate of price change to any "jump" in anticipated nominal
GNP growth, whereas in (9) there is no such implication.
3.ESTIMATED EQUATIONS THAT DISTINGUISH LSW FROM NRH-GAF
Thepresent section proposes three tests of the relative explanatory
power of the two competing hypotheses of the formation of price expecta-
tions, fitted to U.S. postwar quarterly data.
(1) Using as the dependent variable the Livingston data on the
price expectations of a panel of economic forecasters, (9) and (10) can be
estimated directly.9
(2) Employing as price data the same GNP deflator series used by
Barro, the alternative expectations equations (9) and (10) can be substi-
tuted into (1') to test their relative ability to explain the postwar be-
havior of the inflation rate.
(3) Employing as output data the same real GNP series used by Barro,
the LSW supply equation (7) can be compared with an alternative NRB—GAP version
obtained by substituting (9) into (1') and solving for the current outputgap.
1. Exp7aining Inflation Expectations. The central assumption of the
LSW short—run neutrality hypothesis is a unit—elastic contemporaneous re-
sponse of the expected price level to any change in the expected level of
nominal GNP, holding constant the influence of past nominal GNP ttsurprisestt.
Translated into rates of change, as in equation (10) above, the partial
elasticity of the expected inflation rate to the expected rate of change in
nominal GNP is unity. The validity of this assumption, as well as the re-
lation between price expectations and past nominal GNP surprises, can be
tested on the price expectations of the Livingston panel of economic fore-
casters, as compiled by Carlson (1977).
A series for expected nominal GNP growth (y =+v) can be de-
veloped by fitting an autoregressive equation analogous to Barro's expected
money equation, with past changes in money and in the share of goverument
spending in GNP () as additional explanatory variables:
(11) =010+ 367 y_ + 064 t—2 —182t—3 —148t—4 14.21) [3.85] 10.61] [—1.77] [—1.41]
+ .619 m—.423m








R2 =.430 S.E.E. =.0105D.W. =2.13
Sample Period =1948:Ql—1978:Ql.10
Then the fitted values from equation (11)can be used to test the validity
of equation (10), which states the LSWproposition that expected inflation
should depend on the current expectation of nominalGNP growth, adjusted
for the effect of past nominal GNP surprises.
The basic estimate of the LSW priceexpectation equation (10) is pre-
sented in Table 1, column (1). There is littlesupport in the 1954—75
U.S. data for the LSW hypothesis, since theelasticity of expected in-
flation to expected nominal GNP growth (holdingconstant lagged nominal GNP
surprises) is not 1.0 but only .124, indicating that forecastersexpect 88
percent f an anticipated change in nominal GNP to take the form ofa change
in real output. Stated anotherway, the Livingston forecasters act as if
12
they belz.eve the LSWhypothesisto be false.
The influence of the nominal GNP surprise lastperiod (_e)
separated in Table 1 from earlier surprises, since inequation (10) the first
lag is the only coefficient the sign of which can be determineda pr-ion
(the e terms should be fractions less thanunity, so that the first lag
should have the positive coefficient1—el). In column (1) it appears that
the coefficients on both the first laggedsurprise and on earlier surprises
are insignificant.
All equations in this paper allow for two extra variablesrepresenting
"supply shocks" that cause inflation to change relative, toexpected in-
flation for any given level of the realoutput gap (Hr). The first is a
dummy variable for the 1971—74 Nixon—era price controls, and thesecond is
a proxy for the influence of foreign prices on U.S. domestic
prices (p).
While the NIXCON dummy has thewrong sign in column (1), the foreign price
term is extremely important. This variablemaypartiallybe acting as a11
proxy for lagged domestic prices, which play an important role in explain—
13
ing price expectations in the NR}I—GAPapproach.
Column (2) of Table 1 presents the same equation corrected for the
positive serial correlation present in column (1). This correction alters
the sign on the NIXCON dummy, reduces the foreign price coefficient to a
more plausible size, and yields the conclusion that the response of ex-
pected price change to anticipated nominal GNP growth is zero, not unity as
postulated by the LSW approach. The lagged nominal GNP surprise terms are
insignificant, as in column (1).
Columns (3) and (4) present parallel results, replacing the role of
anticipated and unanticipated changes in nominal GNP by anticipated and un-
anticipated changes in the money supply (Ml), using the Barro—Rush money
Supply equation to provide estimates of m. The results in both columns
indicate a response to anticipated monetary change of zero, rather than the
required elasticity of unity. The main difference between the nominal GNP
and money results is the significant explanatory role of the distributed
lag of past unanticipated monetary change in columns (3) and (4).
Columns (5) and (6) present the alternative results for equation (9),
the statement of expectation formation under the NRH—GAP hypothesis. The
corrected results in column (6) indicate that expectations respond to past
price changes with an elasticity that is insignificantly different from
unity, when the domestic and foreign price contributions are added to-
gether. Expectations are also influenced by the level of the real output
gap and by the Nixon price controls. In fact, it is interesting that the
coefficients on the price control dummy are almost identical in columns(2),
(4), and (6). In this final equation it appears that the Livingston12
forecasters act as if they believe that prices adjust gradually to changes
indemand conditions. The mean lag on the past change in the CPI is 9.9
quarters, and a full 24 quarters of past price information is regarded as
relevant in the formation of expectations; thus the lag distributions on
laggedunanticipated monetary changes in column (4) and on the lagged CPI
changes in column (6) are approximately the same.
Is there any role for nominal GNP or money changes in explaining the
price expectations of the Livingston forecasters? When added to the equa-
tion in column (5), the nominal GNP variables (both current anticipated and
lagged unanticipated changes) are jointly insignificant (the F—value for
joint significance is 0.38, compared with the 5 percent critical value of
3.11). However, the money supply variables are jointly significant (F—value
of 4.75), while the lagged consumer price variables arevery significant
jointly when added to the money equation in column (3) (F—value of 14.9).
Thus a complete explanation of the Livingston inflation expectations series
appears to require use of data on lagged changes both in the CPI and in
money.
There is no need to choose the "best'1 equation in Table 1, since the
results are entirely consistent with the NRH—GAP approach. Expected price
changes do not respond at all to anticipated changes in nominal GNP or
money, implying that these anticipated changes influence real output.
Further, the lag coefficients on unanticipated money in columns (3) and (4)
also support the hypothesis of gradual price adjustment. Recall that in
the Barro—Rush money equation m depends almost entirely onmci. Thus the
lagged surprise terms represent nothing more than a five—year distributed
lLf
lagon actual changes in the money supply.13
2. &rplaining the Inflation Rate. Equation (1') above states that the
difference between the actual and expected inflation rates is a function
of the real output gap. If inflation expectations are formed by the LSW
hypothesis, represented by equation (10) above, then equation (1') would be
completely consistent with the LSW hypothesis that real output is independent
of anticipated changes in nominal GNP. The rate of change of prices in this
case would be calculated by substituting (10) into (1'):
e e *
(12) Pt = +v — +I •Z y.. + 8H +
i=1 j=l
Thealternative hypothesis that price expectations are formed in a manner
that is consistent with the gradual adjustment of prices would involve sub-
stituting (9) above into (1'):
(13) Pt I Ai—i + (b+)H + y
1=1 t t
In Table 2 column (1) displays the direct estimate of equation (12),
while column(2)is a "money—only" version which assumes that the actual
and expected growth rates of velocity are both zero. Column (3) represents
an estimate of equation (13).
Most of the results in Table 2 duplicate those in Table 1. The elas-
ticity of price change to current expectations of nominal GNP or money
growth is not unity, as required by the LSW hypothesis, but only .14 in
column (1) and .05 in column (2). As in the previous Table, the money—only
version fits better than the nominal GNP version; the coefficients on the
NIXCON and foreign price variables in the money—only equation are significant
and have the expected sign; and the long distributed lag on unanticipated
monetary changes indicates that a full seven yearsisrequired for prices to
adjust to actual changes in money.14
Column (3) represents an estimate of equation (13) above, the NRH—
GAP hypothesis that inflation depends on the history of past price changes,
as well as on current demand and supply factors. The coefficient on the
current output gap indicates that the short—run Phillips curve has a slope
of .27 when inflation is expressed at an annual rate; for instance,
holding constant the history of inflation and the values of the other
variables, a 5 percentage point positive output gap implies an inflation
rate that is 1.4 percentage points faster at an annual rate than when the
output gap is zero. The Nixon control effect is significant in the expected
direction in columns (2) and (3), with a cumulative impact of either —3.0 or
—2.1 percent in 1971—72 followed by an offsetting rebound in 1974.
The pattern of coefficients on the Nixon control dummy and the foreign
price proxy can be explained as follows. Comparing Columns (1) and (3), we
note that the coefficient on the foreign price term in the former is twice the
value in column (3); given the positive correlation between p and pr', the
t t
large coefficient on p' in column (1) represents an attempt by the computer
t
to find a variable that can provide the required explanatory power of the
missing lagged On the other hand, the F' variable grows much more
rapidly than p in 1974, setting a natural limit on the size of the
coefficient onp. Further, the rapid growth period of p is partly collinear
in 1974 with the "rebound" portion of the Nixon control dummy, forcing down
the coefficient on NIXCON in equations like that in column (1) where lagged
p is missing and F .isrequired to have a large coefficient. Notice
t—i t—].
that in column (2), where the sum of coefficients on p. is smaller than in
column (3), the coefficient inNIXCON is correspondingly larger.15
Is there any role for current expectations of changes in nominal
GNP or money in explaining price behavior, given the past history of prices?
When the past history of prices is added to the equation of either columns
(1)or (2), the coefficient on anticipated changes in either nominal GNP
or money is insignificantly different from zero. On the other hand, lagged
unanticipated changes in nominal GNP or money do contribute significantly
to the explanation of price change when added to the autoregressive equation
in column (3). This suggests that, while the results in Table 2 reject the
required unitary response of price change to anticipated nominal GNP or
money change, there is a remaining role for demand changes in explaining
price change that is not completely represented by the Ht variable in
column (3).
3. Eplan-ingtheOutputGap.Afinal comparison of the LSW and NRH—
GAP approaches involves the estimation of output equations. This allows us
to test directly the conflicting predictions that onlyunexpectednominal
GNP or monetary changes influence real output (LSW), versus allnominalGNP
or monetary changes—whether anticipated or not—influence real output during
the.intervalrequired for price adjustment (NR1i-GA). None of the unemploy-
ment or output equations in the three Barro empirical papers provide any test
of this alterna.tive hypotheais




Thus the output gap (He) responds to the current and lagged "surprise"
in nominal GNP growth. The competing NRB—GAP hypothesis can be rewritten
as an output equation when (13) is solved for the output gap:
1 *
(15) =l+b+m+ Vt
— + —E —
1=1
where we use. the identityPt '
— andthe definitions of and
Thus the. competing hypothesis isnot that ttonly unexpected nominalGNP
changesmatter't, but rather that 'real output depends on actualnominalGNP
changes a&juteZ for the pact history of prices." The longer prices take to
adjust to an acceleration of nominal GNPgrowth,the longer a real output
gap can persist, even if nominal GNPbehavioris fully anticipated.
A minor difference between Barrots papers and our empirical investiga-
tion ofoutput behavior Involves the treatment of ttnaturaltr output (Q*)
* BarroIgnores previous research on Q,usesthe log of real output as his
* dependentvariable, and attempts to capture the influence of Q on the right—
hand side of his equation by including a time trend and his peculiar MIL
variable (see. Small, 1978). A preferable procedure is to take advantage of
the research of Perloff and Wachter (1978) which takes explicit account of
the production function linking to capital, energy,and"natural" labor
input. The growth of Q* has slowed in the l970s, due to the deceleration
in the growth of capital and energy input relative to labor input, and the use of
aQ* series taking account of this deceleration avoids the misspecification
involved in Barro's extraneous MIL variable. Thus the dependent variable in




Table 3 reports estimates of equations (14) and (15) and relatedequations
involving the growth of nominal GNP. Because of the need to use a long
distributed lag of past nominal GNP changes, and becausequarterly nominal
GNP data are unavailable prior to 1947, all equations in Table3 share a
coon sample period running from 1954 to 1978.
Although both the LSW and NRH-GAPhypothesessuggest that nominal GNP
growth (i.e., money growth and velocity growth) should be relevant for
explaining the output gap, Barro's work has concentrated on the behavior
of money growth alone. To provide equations analogous toBarro's,
Table 4 repeats each equation from Table 3, withmoney growth replacing
nominal GNP growth. Because of the availability ofmoney supply data
before 1947, the equations in Table 4 have been estimatedover the longer
1949—78 sample period.
If column (1) in Table 3 is viewed as a test of equation (1), a "pure"
version of the LSW hypothesis without any influence of lagged "surprise"
terms, then that view is rejected by the estimated equation. The co-
efficient on unexpected nominal GNP change is insignificant, and the
explanatory power of the equation is weak. Following a more general approach
in which lagged "surprises" are allowed to influence the level of real out-
put, as in equation (14), column (2) exhibits the effect of adding lagged
values of unexpected nominal GNP growth. While the fit of the equation is
improved somewhat, its standard error is still large and its Durbin—Watson
statistic is extremely low. Most important is the fact that a full 27 quarters
of lagged "surprise" data are significant (this was the longest lag distri-
bution examined). While persistence of the output gap is consistent with18
the NRH—GAP hypothesis, it strains credulity to imagine a mechanism by
which a nominal GNP "surprise" could still influence real output seven
years later as required for column (2) in Table 3 to be consistent with the
LSW hypothesis.
In contrast to the weak explanation of the output gap exhibited in
columns (1) and (2), the estimate of the NRE—GAP approach in equation (15)
is presented in column (3). Not only is the estimated standard error only
one—tenth of the LSW error in equation (1), but all of the coefficients are
conisteit with the theoretical specification and with the corresponding
inflation equation in Table 2. Using column (3) of Table 2, we can compare
the estimated coefficients with column (3) of Table 3:
Table 2 Table 3
b+ .068




p .157 .154; .146
Column (3) can be interpreted as saying that "given the inherited values
of inflation and the output gap, the elasticity of the output gap to a
fully anticipated acceleration in nominal income growth is 88 percent."
While the contrast between the results in columns (1) and (2) on, the19
one hand, and in column (3) on the other hand, is sufficiently dramatic
to establish the main argument of the paper, some critics may claim that
the attractive characteristics of column (3) are due to the presence of
16
the lagged dependent variable on the right—hand side of the equation.
The NRH—GAP output equation (15) can be.solved recursively to eliminate
the lagged dependent variable; this transformation makes the output gap
a function of a distributed lag of the other independent variables. The
results of estimating the transformed equation are exhibited in columns
(4) and (5), without and with a correction for positive serial correlation.
We note that the NRB—GAP equation in column (4), in which both anticipated
and unanticipated nominal GNP changes matter, improves the fit of both LSW
equations in columns (1) and (2) by a factor of three. Although the equation
in column (4) exhibits significant positive serial correlation, the trans-
formed equation in column (5) appears to have roughly the same sums of
coefficients on lagged income and price change.
In order to provide results that are comparable directly to the Barro—
Rush quarterly output equations, Table 4 duplicates the equations in
Table 3 with money change everywhere replacing nominal CNP change.
As in Table 3, column (1) in Table 4 indicates that there is no statistically
significant relation between the real output gap and the current money "surprise,"
thus rejecting the "pure" version of the LSW hypothesis. Only when a long
series of lagged "surprises" is included is the joint effect of the surprise
terms significant, and the shape of the lag distribution seems to be quite
sensitive to a correction for positive serial correlation (compare columns 2 and 3).
Confirming Table 3, we note that the estimated version of the NRH—GkP20
equation (15) in column (4) of Table 4 explains the output gap data much
better than either of the unexpected money equations; the standarderror
is lower by a factor of almost three (compare columns 2 and 4). Even without
the "help" of the lagged dependent variable, the versions of the 1SRIi—GAP
equations in columns (5) and (6) outperform the lagged "surprise" equations
in columns (2) and (3).
An interesting feature of the output results is a consistent difference
in the explanatory power of the nominal GNP andmoney equations. Holding
constant the sample period, the LSW equations fitbetterfor money "surprises"
thanfor nominal GNP "surprises," whereas the NRH—GAP equations fit better
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for nominalGNP change than for money change. 'Why? Two related
conjectures appear to account for this pattern. First, anticipated changes
in velocity "matter", thus accounting for the better performance of the NRH—GAP
equationsusing nominal GNP growth as an explanatory variable. Second, the
nominal GNP equation used to estimate y does a better job than Barro's
equation used to estimate m. Small's research (1978) has shown that
Barro treats as unanticipated important instances of money change that could
have been anticipated by economic agents at the time. If anticipated changes
in money influence real output, as implied by the three right—hand columns
of Table 4, then much of the explanatory power of Barro's "money surprise"
variable may actually represent the influence of anticipated monetary changes.
If we accept the implication that Table 3 is a preferable comparison of the
LSW and 1RE—GAP hypotheses, because Barro's money equation used to create
in Table 4 is misspecified, then we can regard thepoor performance of
the LSW equations in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 as analogQus to the21
poor performance of Small's (1978) unemployment equation when an improved
specification of m is used.The conclusion that the equations in Table
4 are tnisspecified would also explain the inconsistent pattern of coefficients
onthe Nixon control and foreign price variables in that table.
4. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RESULTS
Virtually none of the conclusions of Barro's three papers (1977) (1978) (1979)
emergeintact when viewed from the perspective of Tables 1 through 4.
1.According to Barro, "the hypothesis that forms the basis of
thisempirical study is that only unanticipated movements in money affect
real economic variables like the unemploymentrate or the level of output"
(1977,p. 101, emphasis added). Yet Table 4 provides equations in which
the real output gap depends on both anticipated and unanticipated money
changes.Further, not only does Table 4 deny that only unanticipated money
changes matter, but also it contains the finding that current money surprises
do not matter at all in explaining real output.
2. Barro (1978, pp. 565—6) states as a "basic hypothesis" that
"perceived movements in the money stock ... implyequiproportionate, con-
temporaneous movements in the price level." Yet Table 2 strongly rejects
this basic hypothesis and finds instead that the contemporaneous response
of price change to perceived movements inmoney, holding constant the
influence of past monetary surprises, has an elasticity ofonly 0.05, and
to perceived movements in nominal GNP an elasticity ofonly 0.14. Approxi-
mately seven years is required for the full equiproportionateadjustment
to take place.
3. Contradicting the LSW hypothesis of policyimpotence, the22
Barro—Rush (1979, Table 1, column 2) quarterly results find a significant
impact on real output of government spending, whether anticipated or not.
Table 3 confirms a role for changes in velocity, whether caused by policy
or nonpolicy influences, in that the versions of the NRB—GAP equations
using nominal GNP fit considerably better than those using only monetary
changes (see footnote 17).
4. Barro claims (1978, p. 573) that "there is no indication from
these calculations of a downward effect of controls on the price level."
Yet Tables 2 and 3 report the consistent result that the Nixon controls
held down the price level by a statistically significant 2.1 percent,
almost exactly the same as my most recent published estimate (1977, p. 263).
Barro makes no mention in his quarterly estimates of other supply shift
elements that might have affcted real output and the price level, but
Tables 2 and 3 report a significant and consistent impact of a proxy for
the influence of foreign prices on U. S. domestic prices.
5. Barro—Rush (1979) admit "some lack of robustness in the
price equation" and the possibility of "some misspecification of this
relation." Several of their variables lose significance when a correction
for serial correlation is performed, and the lagged effects of money
"surprises" in the price equation are not consistent with those in the
output equation. In contrast the NRH—GAP inflation equation in Table 2, column (3),
yields parameter estimates that are almost identical with those estimated
in the NRH—GAP output equation (Table 3, column 3). The respective mean
lags in response to past price changes are almost identical——9.4 and 9.9
quarters.23
5. CONCLUSIONS
The finding in this paper that fully anticipated changes in nominal
GNP and money influence real output appears to reinstate the orthodox view
that "changes in money matter in the short run, whether anticipated or not."
The "pure" version of the LSW hypothesis that relates the output gap only to
current surprises in money or nominal GNP seems to be decisively rejected.
A modified LSW approach is developed in which constructed "surprise"
variables have a statistically significant impact on real output when entered
as a long distributed lag, a lagged effect that has been rationalized
recently in theoretical models developed by Lucas (1975) and Blinder and
Fischer (1978). Thus this paper does not purport to claim that lagged
surprises have no influence on real output.
No such claim is made because no such claim is necessary. Once it has
been shown, as in this paper, that fully anticipated changes in nominal GNP
and money do influence real output, then the role of past unanticipated
changes ceases to be an interesting question. Lucas, Sargent, and Wallace
are, after all, the proponents of the dogmatic and radical position that the
set of factors X that influence real output can be subdivided into Xl
and X2, and that only Xl matters. All that is necessary to refute this
position is to show that X2 also matters, as in this paper. The finding of
statistically significant effects of lagged surprises is of no importance
because the orthodox view of stabilization policy is completely compatible
with a role for innovations in nominal income as a determinant of the real
output gap.24
In this sense the present debate contains the same asymmetryas
the early 1960s debate over whether "only money matters." Nonmonetarists
in that episode felt that they could rest their case by showing that
fiscal policy also matters, since they viewed positive effects of monetary
policy as consistent with their position. In the same way, proponents of
the NRH—GAP approach can rest their case by showing that anticipated
nominal GNP changes also matter,, since they view a positive impact of
unanticipated changes as consistent with their position.
An important theme running through recent discussions of the short—run
and long—run neutrality hypotheses is the difficulty of identifying the
structure of an economic model from aggregative time series data, because
several models may be compatible with a time—series dependence of, for
instance, nominal GNP growth on lagged monetary changes (Sargent, 1976).
More informally, "you can't get a structure out of a time series." For
this reason there can be no pretense in this paper that the apparent time—
series dependence of real output on current and lagged fully anticipated
changes in money can identify the particular structural model that introduces
inertia into the process of price adjustment. For instance, there is no
necessity to tie the NRH—GAP hypothesis to any particular model of implicit
contracts, layoffs, or customer markets, any more than Barro is required to
identify the particular theory that allows his lagged monetary surprises to
influence real output.
Whether or not one is satisfied with the underlying theory of
Lucas supply functions or price inertia is quite irrelevant in the current
asymmetric debate. Instead an appeal to the facts is both necessary and25
sufficient to settle the issue. The Sargent (1976) "observational
equivalence" conundrum does not prevent a choice between the LSW and
NRH—GAP approaches, even though both hypotheses implicitly make real
output and price change a function of a distributed lag of past nominal
GNP or monetary change, because the LSW alternative requires for its
validity strong restrictions that can be statistically rejected (e.g.,
that the coefficient on anticipated nominal GNP change of pricechange is
unity and of real output is zero, holding constant past monetary surprises).
In all of this the roles of price flexibility and rational
expectations have been frequently confused by economists writing on the
short—run neutrality issue. The rational expectations hypothesiscan be
interpreted as stating that "people respond to processes in the economy."
If one of those processes with which peopleare familiar is the three—year
staggered wage contract, then a rational expectation of the inflation rate
will be based at least partly on the past history of prices to which the
present rate of price change is mechanically connected. Many economists
who have readily adopted the assumption that agents arecompletely rational
seem curiously reluctant to accept the parallel assumption thatagents act
in their own self interest. Instead of dismisaing models ofdisequilibrium
price adjustment as involving "a failure of agents to realize perceived
gains from trade," economists should devote more serious attention to the
possibility that existing contractual arrangements may represent an efficient
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response to uncertainty and the real costs of bargaining.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the earlier Barro of
gradual price adjustment and quantity constraints as at last emerged26
19 triumphant over the more recent classical equilibrium Rarro. It now
appears fruitless to continue to promote a set of dogmaticpropositions that
"X2 does not matter" while hiding ostrich—likefrom the pervasive reality
of price inertia that invalidates thosepropositions. Instead, a much more
productive line of research would be to provide aconvincing theoretical
explanation of price inertia itself, as well as variations inthe inertia
parameter across markets, countries, and time. Precisely what factors
explain why some products are bought and sold inspot auction markets, while
other products have prices that are administered andchanged infrequently?
Why was the post—1973 division of nominal GNP betweenprice and output change
more favorable in Germany than in the U. S.? Why was thesame division more
favorable between 1929 and 1933 in Europe than in the U.S.? What are the
sources of the U. S. institutions of staggered and decentralizedlong—term
wage contracts, with only partial cost—of—living escalation, and what factors
have caused changes in those institutions and thus in theU. S. price inertia
parameter?27
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1. The first half of the present paper by Robert Barro and Mark
Rush (1979) presents a suiary and extensions of aprevious paper (1978)
based on annual data; the second half contains estimates ofsome of the
same equations for quarterly data. Since the presentpaper does not
contain an explicit statement of the hypotheses beingtested, nor of the
alternative hypotheses that are implicitly rejected, the discussantis
forced to refer back to the earlier Barropapers (1977) (1978). These
comments treat together the combined results of the threepapers.
2. Perfect price flexibility,necessary for the LSW hypothesis
to be valid, would insulate real output fromany anticipated shock. For
instance, the 1974 quadrupling of the price of oil, while it would reduce
the "natural" level of output, could have not effecton the gap between
actual and "natural" output, once the price hikewas announced.
3. This would include a series ofpapers by the conference organizer,
e.g., Fischer and Cooper (1973).
4. See Nordhaus (1975).
5. Thus I was startled to read in Blinder'scomment (1979), that
"...Key-nesians have been searching for an obvious flaw in [Barro's]
methodology. That one has not been found suggests that the basicflaw,
if indeed there is one, is far from obvious." Thepresent comment argues
that the flaw is patently obvious——Barro's equationsare simply irrelevant
in determining the role of anticipated changes inpolicy, because his
specification cannot distinguish the LSW hypothesis from thecompeting
price—inertia hypothesis on which the orthodox view of stabilizationpolicy is
based.30
6.Table 2 of the quarterly Barro—Rush (1979)results exhibit a
six—yearadjustment lag in the price equation whenno correction is made
for serially correlated residuals, anda four—yearlag in the equations
reestimated with an adjustment for second—order serialcorrelation.
7. Barro's text explicitly deniesany connection between the long
price—adjustment lags and "explanations for price stickinessof the
'disequilibrium' or contracting variety." This denialappears to rest
entirely on the discrepancy between the adjustment lags in theoutput
and price equations. Yet there is anotherexplanation of the inconsistent
lags, namely his misspecificatjon of both theoutput and price equations
(seebelow).
8. The Barro—Rush results thus provide theneeded refutationof the
erroneouscriticism of my (1975) conclusions thatappears in Barro(1978,p. 571):
"Theeffect of anticipated money movements onthe price level can be
virtuallyinstantaneous at the same time that unanticipatedmovements .
affectthe price level only with a long lag." Far frombeing instantaneous,
the full response of prices to an anticipatedmonetary change in Barro—Rush
requires a time span of 23 quarters.
9. In the following, upper—case lettersrepresent levels of the
logs of variables, and lower—case letters represent theirpercentage rates
of change. Equation (1) can be compared to thesupply function used in the
discussion of the LSW hypothesis in Barro—Fischer(1976, p. 157):
(a) =a(P
—Et(P+i))+
In(a) output decisions depend on a discrepancy betweenthis period's price
level and the expected price level nextperiod, with intertempora]. speculation31
as the motive for the supply response. Since Barro's present empirical work
revolves around an unanticipated discrepancy between this period's actual
money supply and the expectations for this period based on information
available last period, the underlying supply function must be:
(b) = — E_i(P))+ ct
This is the version of the Lucas supply function considered by Blinder
and Fischer (1978, P. 3).The use of (b) implies an assumption of
imperfect Information about the aggregate price level in the current period
by individual agents. Then (1) in the text follows from (b) when we
define:
Pt =
— and p Ei(Pt) —
10.Notice that if the output gap depends only on current price
surprises, with no influence of the history of the output gap, so
that e1=o (i=l,...,03), then equation (6) reduces to: p =m+ v —+ Ht_l.
Thus, if a positive monetary surprise in period t—1 had caused a positive
output gap, then a rational expectation of a perfectly flexible price level
in period t would make an allowance for the extra price "jump" needed to
eliminate the previous gap.
11. The parameter b in (9) is not necessarily identical toin (1'),
becauseis an uncertain parameter that shifts in response to structural
changes and past policy actions, as suggested by Lucas (1976). Thus b
represents an estimate of the unknown .
12.The sample period ends in 1975:Q4, the final observation provided
by Carison (1977) for the dependent variable. The starting date of 1954:Ql32
in this and subsequent tables is motivated by the need touse up to 28
quarters of information on lagged values of nominal GNP, expected nominal
GNP, unexpected nominal GNP, and the GNP deflator.
13.In, this and subsequent tables, only two variables are included
to represent supply shifts. The Nixon control dummy is defined so
that its coefficient indicates the cumulative effect on the level of
prices during the period 1971:Q3—1972:Q4, and it is constrained to force
the effect of the removal of controls in 1974 exact!Ly to balance the
initial restraining effect (see note c, Table 1). The foreign price
variable tests the hypothesis that U. S. prices of exports and import
substitutes respond to foreign prices. In my current research I have also
found that other supply shift variables, including changes in the effective
minimum wage rate and in various tax rates, have significant effects on the
rate of change of U. S. prices. The limited scope of this paper prevents
an exploration of the full set of supply shift variables.
In Table 1 the dependent variable for quarter t is the Livingston
forecast made in the last month of the quarter for the price level six months
later. Thus the equations in columns (1) and (2) assume that the forecasters
know the actual values of nominal GNPandthe money supply through quarter
t—1, and that they are able to make an accurate estimate of the outputgap
in quarter t. Given the persistence of the output gap demonstrated in
Table 3 below, an ability to guess H correctly in the middle of the current
quarter seems reasonable.
14. A 28—quarter lag distribution (the current quarter and 27 lagged
quarters) was the maximum length used in this study.
15. Just as the Bar.ro-Rush unemployment equations in their Table 133
ignore 1947 and 1948 because of the peculiar relation betweenoutput and
unemployment during that interval, the present paper omits 1947 and 1948
from the output gap equations.
16. Note that the equation has other desirable features, despite
the presence of the lagged dependent variable, particularly theconsistency
of the estimated coefficients between Tables 2 and 3.
17. The respective standard errors for the shorter 1954—78
sample period for the five equations in Table 3 whenmoney is inserted
in placeof nominal GNP are, respectively:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
.0264 .0187 .0080 .0117 .0075
18. A start in this direction has been maderecentlyby Hall
and Lilien (1978).
19. For the earlier vintage, see especially Barro and Grossman
(1976, Chapters 2 and 5).TABLE 1 34
Alternative Equations for the
a
Livingston Expected Inflation Series
Sample Period: 1954:Ql—1975:Q4




















































































R .868 .986 .937 .986 .951 .988
S.E.E. .0018 .0006 .0013 .0006 .0011 .0006







[0.00] indicates t ratio.
(o.olo)indicatesmean lag and the furthest significant lag coefficient for a
variable entered as a distributed lag. All lag distributions are assumed to
lie along a third—degree polynomial, and all are constrained to equal zero
in the final quarter.35
Notes to Table 1
a. The dependent variable is the six—month expected change in the CPI,
fromCarison (1977, Table 1), with alternate quarters interpolated from the
reported data.
b. Each equation also contains a constant term.
c. The independent variables are as follows:
;e Fitted value of the quarterly rate of change of nominal
GNP, see equation ( in the text.
Fittedvalue of the quarterly rate of change of Ml,
using the Barro—Rush quarterly money supply equation.
* * Thequarterly rate of change of "natural" real GNP (Q ).
See the explanation of Ht.
p The quarterly rate of change of the all—item Consumer
Price Index.
The percentage GNP gap (log — log Q), where is
real GNP, and Q is taken from Cordon (1978, Table B—2)
for the period 1947—70 and from Perloff—Wachter (1978) for
the period 1971—78.
NIXCON A dummy variable set equal to 1/6 during the six quarters
1971:Q3 through 1972:Q4 and to —1/4 during the four
quarters 1974:Q2 through 1975:Ql.
p The quarterly rate of change of the average of the
import and export deflators from the U. S. National
Income Accounts.TABLE 2
Alternative Equations for the
Rate of Change of the GNPDeflator
Sample Period:1954: Ql—1978 : Qi




















































R .772 .847 .818
S.E.E. .0032 .0026 .0028
D.—W. 1.65 2.21 1.93
All notes to Table 1 also apply to this table.
36TABLE 3
Equations Explaining the Output Gap (Hr)
UsingChanges in Nominal GNP
37
Sample Period:1954: Ql—1978 : Qi







































.068 .019 .094 .021
[1.22] [1.30] [3.42] j5.97] (2.71]











R2 .242 .325 .993 .949 .992
S.E.E. .0268 .0256 .0027 .0072 .0029
D.—W. 0.1 0.1 1.91 0.4 1.65
p .966
F36.7]
All notesto Table 1 also apply to this table.TABLE 4
Equations Explaining the Output Gap (He)
Using Changes in the Money Supply (tnt)
Sample Period: 1949:Ql—1978:Ql
















































































R2 .137 .459 .913 .931 .745 .931
S.E.E. .0314 .0251 .0100 .0091 .0175 .0090





All notesto Table 1 also apply to this table.
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